We model a single-supplier, 73-store supply chain as a dynamic discrete choice problem. We estimate the model with transaction-level data, spanning 3,251 products and 1,370 days. We find two phenomena: ration gaming (strategic inventory hoarding) and the bullwhip effect (the amplification of demand variability along the supply chain). To establish ration gaming, we show that upstream scarcity can trigger an inventory run, as the stores scramble to secure supply. And to establish the bullwhip effect, we show that shipments from suppliers are more variable than sales to customers. We estimate that the bullwhip effect would be 12% smaller in the counterfactual scenario without ration gaming incentives, confirming the long-standing hypothesis that ration gaming causes the bullwhip effect.
Introduction
We develop a structural econometric supply chain model. We consider two echelons-a store and its supplier-but our approach extends to more general logistics networks, in the fashion of Clark and Scarf (1960) . We use our model to answer a two-decade-old supply chain question: Does ration gaming cause the bullwhip effect? Lee et al. (1997) define both concepts, framing the former as a driver of the latter.
Ration gaming is a tragedy of the commons. Multiple stores source inventory from a single supplier, whose inventory the stores must husband collectively. If the stores cooperated, they would curtail their orders when the supplier inventory runs low, scrimping for those most in need. However, they are self-interested, and thus do the opposite: they order more when upstream supply runs short, hoarding inventory to hedge against a potential upstream stock out. The extreme case is an inventory runs (akin to a bank run).
This strategic stockpiling can contribute to the bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect is the amplification of demand volatility along the supply chain. For example, the bullwhip effect will make demand for beer more variable at a brewery, which ships by the truckload, than at a liquor store, which sells by the six-pack.
We test whether ration gaming drives the bullwhip effect in a Chinese grocery supply chain spanning one distribution center (DC) and 73 stores. We observe this supply chain at the transaction level: we see every inventory movement-from supplier to DC, from DC to store, and from store to customer-and every inventory request-from store to DC and from DC to supplier. We first establish in reduced form that this supply chain exhibits both ration gaming (the probability that a store places an order increases by 35% when the DC's inventory level falls below its first decile) and the bullwhip effect (for all 3,251 products in our sample, inbound shipments from the DC are more variable than outbound sales to the customer). We then model the representative store's inventory problem as a dynamic discrete choice, and use this model to infer how the supply chain would operate without ration gaming. We estimate that ration gaming underlies 12% of the bullwhip effect, confirming Lee et al.'s (1997) hypothesis.
This finding implies managers can eliminate a significant portion of the bullwhip effect.
Most bullwhip drivers are unavoidable: e.g., a store can't make its demand less autocorrelated. In contrast, ration gaming is solvable: a firm can eradicate gaming by aligning incentives along the supply chain.
Data
We study the sixth-largest supermarket chain in China. Its revenues were $4. 53, $4.75, and $4.55 billion in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively . By the end of 2014 it had 1,719 convenience stores, 2,415 supermarkets, and 157 "hypermarkets" (a hypermarket contains both a department store and a grocery market). We focus on the hypermarkets because the retailer operates them, whereas it franchises the smaller stores. We specifically study the Shanghai distribution center's hypermarkets, which are in Shanghai, Anhui, and Jiangsu.
These stores have different managers who optimize different performance metrics (a combination of sales, gross margins, inventory levels, and stock out rates). The managers operate with autonomy. They see the inventory levels at their store and at the DC, but not at the other stores. At the store-item level and with daily frequency, the firm's database reports: (i) sales, (ii) wholesale prices, (iii) retail prices, (iv) current price promotions, (v) start-of-day inventories at the store, (vi) start-of-day inventories at the DC, (vii) store-to-DC orders, and (viii) DC-to-store shipments.We observe these variables from April 1, 2011 to December 31, 2014. However, we do not observe orders or shipments from October 23, 2011 to December 31, 2012, due to a lost Excel file.
Our raw sample is large, so we can be selective about which products we study. We filter out products that do not fit §5's empirical model. Specifically, we remove a store-item from our sample if (i) it is cross-docked rather than stored at the DC, (ii) more than 10% of its shipments require more than a day to arrive, (iii) more than 10% of its nonzero shipment quantities differ from their corresponding order quantities, (iv) it has fewer than 500 daily observations, (v) fewer than 3% of its observations have a positive shipment quantity, (vi) fewer than 8% of its observations have a store inventory level change, (vii) the retail price, including promotions, has a coefficient of variation in excess of 0.25, or (viii) the wholesale price has a coefficient of variation in excess of 0.15.
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of our resulting sample. And Figure 1 illustrates the data of a representative product: a 250g Guben brand whitening laundry soap 5-pack, sold in a Shanghai store. The figure illustrates six features prevalent across our sample:
1. The store orders in fixed lot sizes: the distinct order quantities are 0, 6, 12, 18, and 24. (Sample-wide, each store-item's six most-common order quantities account for 99.3% of orders.) 2. The store and DC inventories follow (S t , s t ) policies with unstable S t and s t : the range of the reorder point, s t , is eight times the standard lot size, and the range of the stock-up-to level, S t , is nine times the standard lot size. (Sample-wide, 58% of reorder point ranges and 74% of stock-up-to level ranges exceed five times the standard lot size.) 3. The shipping lead time is one day: of the 99 shipments to the store, 95 arrived the following day. (Sample-wide, 95.2% of shipments arrived within one day.) 4. The DC generally fulfills orders fully or not at all: of the 104 non-zero orders placed, only 2 were partially fulfilled, with s / ∈ {0, q}. 3 Ration Gaming 3.1 Overview Lee et al. (1997) theorize that stores may game the means by which inventory is rationed.
Retailers, they explain, compete for customer demand and for vendor supply-they jockey for stock in times of scarcity. And self-interested stores will act to to deceive: To appear more deserving stores will request more inventory than they need when they foresee curtailed shipments. Cachon and Lariviere (1999a) show that a supplier can obviate this trickery by adopting a lexicographic allocation rule, ranking the stores randomly and fulfilling their orders sequentially. This policy is truth-inducing because inflating orders under lexicographic allocation only earns a store inventory it doesn't want. The DC we observe follows a lexicographic allocation rule, and should thus be immune to ration gaming. However, while it does not suffer the "strategic manipulation" Lee et al. (1997) and Cachon and Lariviere (1999a) describe, it endures a new ration gaming malady: inventory runs.
Until now, researchers have only studied lexicographic allocation in static models. 1
Without dynamics, lexicographic allocation aligns the supply chain by eliminating deception (Lariviere, 2010) . But lexicographic allocation is gameable in dynamic contexts, in which stores need merchandise now and in the future. In this case, anticipation of impending scarcity can trigger an inventory run-stores simultaneously scrambling to amass private stocks to hedge against a prospective supply interruption. The idea of the inventory run is similar in spirit to the story of ration gaming: inventory miss-allocation due to competitive supply sourcing. So we consider inventory runs another form of ration gaming.
Its mechanism, however, is new. In Lee et al.'s (1997) and Cachon and Lariviere's (1999a) ration gaming models competition for supply leads to deceit-a store ordering two weeks of supply in hopes of receiving a week's worth-but in our model competition for supply leads to hoarding-a store ordering two weeks of supply in anticipation of next week's bare shelves. The truth-inducing lexicographic allocation rule does not resolve this form of ration gaming because the impulse to hoard is not a lie: the stores submit inflated orders because they want inflated shipments.
Stylized Model
The following model establishes the theoretical possibility of inventory runs in a supply chain. Henceforth, all references to "ration gaming" correspond to these inventory runs.
N stores sell a single product. The product is in demand until stopping time T , after which it becomes obsolete. The obsolescence time is exponentially distributed with mean τ . The stores observe τ , but not T -they cannot anticipate when the product will go out of fashion. While the product is in demand, customers arrive at the stores according to independent Poisson processes, with arrival intensity λ. Each customer demands one unit of inventory. Each store incurs inventory underage cost µ for each customer it does not satisfy and inventory overage cost η for each unit of obsolete stock it holds at time T .
The stores order inventory from a common upstream distribution center (DC). At time zero, the stores have zero inventory, and the DC has N i 0 units. The DC does not receive additional supply, so the average store can sell at most i 0 products. There is no shipping lead time from the DC to the stores, and the DC fulfills the orders it can promptly and in full. However, if the sum of orders in a given instant exceeds the upstream inventory, the DC dispenses stock according to a lexicographic allocation rule, fulfilling orders to the fullest extent possible in a random sequential manner (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999a) .
The following proposition characterizes a limiting equilibrium with inventory runs. Proposition 1. As N → ∞, there is a Nash equilibrium in which each store orders up to ρ(i) when the DC inventory divided by the number of stores is i, where
and ι * = min(1, ι * ).
Under this asymptotic equilibrium, the DC's inventory level falls steadily with demand until it reaches threshold N (ι * − ι * ), which triggers an inventory run in which each store orders ι * − ι * units, exhausting the DC's supply. Storing inventory at the DC-like storing money at the bank-is only viable when the supplier is solvent. Stores withdraw their inventory when the DC's liabilities (its expected future orders) exceed its assets (its onhand stock).
The following proposition establishes that the probability of an inventory run is strictly positive in the limit (the online appendix provides all proofs).
Proposition 2. Under Proposition 1's asymptotic equilibrium, the probability of an inventory run is min 1, exp
There are inventory runs because the supply chain is misaligned. The stores worry about their own inventories as well as their supplier's. But the DC's inventory level should be the DC's problem, not the stores'. The only reason the stores consider the upstream inventory level is because they incur a negative externality when their supplier stocks out. In a coordinated supply chain, the DC would internalize this negative externality of unreliable supply-it would bear the responsibility for stock outs that originate upstream.
Indeed, Clark and Scarf (1960) and Lee and Whang (1999) show that a self-interested DC and store coordinate optimally when the former compensates the latter fairly for supply disruptions. The reimbursements from the DC make the store indifferent to the upstream inventory level. Accordingly, under the supply-chain-optimal policy, the store acts as if the DC has unlimited supply.
The following proposition establishes that this insight carries over to our model: disregarding the upstream inventory level yields the supply-chain-optimal inventory policy.
Proposition 3. Each store maintaining a constant ι * -unit stock-up-to level minimizes total expected supply chain costs. The stores follow this policy when they believe the DC never stocks out. When each store follows this policy, each store's expected cost decreases by
relative to Proposition 1's asymptotic equilibrium. This quantity is zero when η > µ(λτ ) 2 and strictly positive otherwise.
When the DC has unlimited supply, the stores have no incentive to engage in ration gaming. Thus, compelling the stores to act as if the DC has unlimited supply eliminates inventory runs. Obviating inventory hoarding reduces costs in two ways: First, storage costs are smaller when stores stockpile less. And second, pooling inventory upstream increases the supply chain's allocation flexibility, which enables the stores to satisfy more demand, in aggregate (Anupindi et al., 2012, p. 177) .
This insight that confidence in upstream supply begets optimality in downstream policies underlies our counterfactual analysis in §8. To quantify the effect of ration gaming, we benchmark our retailer's performance to a counterfactual scenario sans inventory hoard incentives. For this counterfactual benchmark, we use the stores' behavior when they believe the DC will fulfill all orders.
Reduced Form Evidence
We now present the first documented evidence of ration gaming. 2 We show that the supply chain suffers moderate inventory runs when the DC's inventory runs low. The effect is more subtle than our model suggests-not every store snatches supply. Nevertheless, the stores do order more frequently when the DC's inventories run low. If the supply chain were aligned, they would do the reverse: they would moderate their orders to reserve stock for the outlets most in need.
Ration gaming has two distinct aspects: rationing-the DC limits supply when its stocks run low-and gaming-the stores selfishly manipulate this inventory allocation scheme. We establish these two facets sequentially, with separate OLS regressions.
First, we demonstrate rationing, showing that the DC fulfills fewer orders when its inventory falls. To estimate the order fulfillment probability as a function of the upstream inventory level, we regress a dummy variable that indicates whether the DC fulfilled an order on 99 dummy variables that indicate the percentile of the DC inventory (we reserve the highest inventory percentile as our reference value). We limit our sample to observations with positive orders, and we remove observations in which the store ordered the previous day, to avoid double counting standing orders. We incorporate 166 control variables: the sales of the given item at the given store, the sales of the given item across all stores, the sales of the given store across all items, the retail price, the wholesale price, the discount rate, the average of each of these variables across the subsequent week, the store's current inventory, and item and month dummies. depicts the difference between the order fulfillment probability at a given DC inventory percentile and the order fulfillment probability at the highest DC inventory percentile.
The probability of the DC fulfilling an order falls from 95% when the DC inventory level is above the first decile to 37% when the DC inventory level is below the first decile. Thus, the DC is (95 − 37)/95 = 61% less likely to fulfill an order when its inventory level is in the bottom 10%: the DC rations inventory when it runs low. The store managers can anticipate this inventory rationing because their IT interface prominently reports the DC's on-hand stock.
Second, we demonstrate gaming, showing that the stores order more frequently when the DC inventory falls. To estimate the probability of placing an order as a function of the upstream inventory level, we regress a dummy variable that indicates whether the given store placed an order on the 99 DC inventory-level dummies and the 166 controls used previously. Again, we remove observations in which the store ordered in the previous day. the difference between the order placement probability at a given DC inventory percentile and the order placement probability at the highest DC inventory percentile. The probability of a store placing an order increases from 9.5% when the DC inventory level is above the first decile to 12.8% when the DC inventory level is below the first decile. Thus, the stores are (12.8 − 9.5)/9.5 = 35% more likely to place an order when the DC inventory level is in the bottom 10%: the stores game the DC's inventory rationing scheme. This ration gaming can drive the bullwhip effect.
4 Bullwhip Effect 4.1 Overview Holt et al.'s (1960) linear quadratic (LQ) inventory model predicts that firms use inventories as shock absorbers to smooth production relative to demand. But empiricists have consistently found the opposite: production variability exceeding sales variability (Blinder et al., 1981; Blanchard, 1983; Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Ramey and West, 1999) . Economists propose several reasons for this conspicuous lack of production smoothing: (i) autocorrelated demand fluctuations (Metzler, 1941; Lovell, 1961; Kahn, 1987; Ramey and West, 1999) ; (ii) order batching (Blinder et al., 1981; Blinder and Maccini, 1991) ; (iii) cost and technology shocks (Maccini and Rossana, 1984; Blinder, 1986a; Miron and Zeldes, 1988; Eichenbaum, 1989) ; and (iv) production cost function non-convexities (Blinder, 1986b; Ramey, 1991; Bresnahan and Ramey, 1994) . Lee et al. (1997) extend this logic to supply chains. They argue that volatility amplifies not just across individual firms-from sales to production-but across entire supply chains-from one company to the next. Demand fluctuations, they explain, escalate as they propagate up a supply chain, like the crack of a whip; they call this phenomenon the bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect makes supply chains less stable upstream than downstream; it corrupts the upstream producer's market signals, which leads to mismatches in supply and demand.
Operations researchers have studied the bullwhip effect extensively for the past two decades (e.g. Metters, 1997; Chen et al., 2000; Cachon et al., 2007; Mendelson, 2012, 2015; Udenio et al., 2015; Osadchiy et al., 2015) . They find that supply chains exhibit the bullwhip effect for the same reasons firms do not exhibit production smoothing:
demand autocorrelation, order batching, cost shocks, and production function kinks. But they also identify a new cause: ration gaming. Lee et al. (1997) theorize that trumped-up orders amplify supply chain volatility (an insight that carries over to our inventory runs).
Economists have not identified ration gaming because the phenomenon cannot arise in their single-agent inventory models-characterizing ration gaming requires a supply chain perspective.
Following Chen and Lee (2012), we estimate the "information flow" bullwhip effect and the "material flow" bullwhip effect, at the product level and across the breadth of the stores.
The former corresponds to demand signals, and the latter to physical goods. Specifically, the information flow bullwhip effect is the standard deviation of store-to-DC orders divided by the standard deviation of demand, and the material flow bullwhip effect is the standard deviation of DC-to-store shipments divided by the standard deviation of sales. 3 Figure 3 demonstrates that both bullwhip types are pervasive: all of our 3,251 products exhibit an information flow bullwhip-with orders more volatile than demand-and a material flow bullwhip-with shipments more volatile than sales. The median order quantity standard deviation is 4.9 times the median demand standard deviation, and the median shipment standard deviation is 4.6 times the median sales standard deviation.
Order batching likely accounts for much of this effect (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Lee et al., 1997) : sample-wide, the average shipment contains 7.6 days worth of supply. Figure   4 illustrates how order batching amplifies supply chain volatility, plotting the sales and orders of a representative product: a 4-pack of 125ml Wangwang brand strawberry milk shake, sold in Yancheng, Jiangsu. Order batching makes shipments more extreme: the most common three strawberry milk shake sales quantities are zero (131 observations), one (133 observations), and two (111 observations), whereas the most common three strawberry milk shake shipment quantities are zero (509 observations), nine (30 observations), and 45 (12 observations). While significant, however, this contribution to the bullwhip effect is moot because it is unavoidable: for as long as there are shipping costs, there will be order batching.
More interesting is the bullwhip attributable to ration gaming, since this a problem the retailer can solve (coordinating the supply chain obviates ration gaming). Unfortunately, however, we cannot test in reduced form whether ration gaming underlies the bullwhip effect. To measure the causal effect of ration gaming on the bullwhip, we must simulate how the stores would order in the absence of inventory runs. And to do that, we must construct a structural econometric model of the supply chain.
5 Empirical Model 5.1 Positioning Blinder and Maccini (1991, p. 87 ) explain that Holt et al.'s (1960) linear quadratic (LQ)
inventory model "has been the organizing framework for almost all empirical work on retail inventories, wholesale inventories, and manufacturers' inventories of materials and supplies." But while popular (see Lovell, 1961; West, 1986; Kahn, 1987; Fair, 1989; Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Ramey and West, 1999) , the LQ specification is flawed:
[Its] underlying theoretical framework is probably inappropriate and inconsistent with the facts. Obviously this leaves both the microeconomics and macroeconomics of inventory behavior in a rather unsatisfactory state (Blinder et al., 1981, p. 444 ).
For example, (i) the LQ specification bars fixed costs, and thus it cannot rationalize periods without inventory orders; (ii) it supposes too much inventory is as costly as too little, and thus it cannot accommodate safety stocks; (iii) it permits negative inventories, and thus it has no notion of stock out; and (iv) it prohibits supply uncertainty, and thus it cannot generalize to multi-echelon supply chains. Most of these problems wash out upon aggregation. But we no longer need to rely on industry aggregates, as we now have detailed micro-level inventory data. Firms nowadays document every supply chain transaction, and record every inventory touch. We need a new workhorse empirical inventory specification to exploit this newfound supply chain visibility.
We believe the (S, s) paradigm will underlie the next generation of structural inventory models. In such a model, inventory is ordered up to maximum threshold S when it reaches minimum threshold s. Arrow et al. (1951) define this policy, Scarf (1960) prove its general optimality, and Blinder and Maccini (1991, p. 93-4) The (S, s) model needs generalizing before it can serve as an empirical framework.
Rather than restrict S and s to remain fixed, we allow them to fluctuate idiosyncratically, considering the general class of order policies in which inventories exhibit a saw-tooth pattern: a process with a negative drift-as sales steadily deplete supply-punctuated with sporadic upward jumps-as periodic orders replenish it. We refer to this more general class of inventory policies as (S t , s t ). The (S t , s t ) empirical paradigm has three benefits:
1. It extends to multi-echelon supply chains, which can be modeled as a sequence of inter-related (S t , s t ) inventory problems (Clark and Scarf, 1960; Federgruen and Zipkin, 1984; Lee and Whang, 1999 3. It permits any numerically solvable specification. Whereas the LQ model imposes strong assumptions to establish a closed-form solution, the (S t , s t ) specification abandons the goal of closed-formedness, enabling the approach to accommodate any logistical consideration (that a computer can handle). Accordingly, the (S t , s t ) specification inherits none of the LQ model's inconsistencies: e.g., Hall and Rust (2000) identify six features in a micro-level inventory dataset that contradict the LQ framework but not the (S t , s t ) framework. Real-world inventory problems do not have neat solutions-they are complex. We can model this complexity with the (S t , s t ) specification.
Playing to these strengths, we create an empirical (S t , s t ) model that (i) characterizes a supply chain, (ii) can be estimated with conventional dynamic discrete choice methods, and (iii) embraces operational details.
We are the fourth to create a micro-econometric (S t , s t ) inventory model, following Aguirregabiria (1999) , Erdem et al. (2003) , and Hendel and Nevo (2006) . 5 We extend their works in five ways:
1. We develop the first estimator of an (S t , s t ) inventory model that factors both order- We do not observe a store's ideal order quantity; rather we observe its ideal order quantity rounded to the nearest batch size. Restricting the store's order quantities to a finite set of points enables our estimator to incorporate both reorder point s t and order quantity S t − s t without becoming overdetermined. We embed all of our supply chain information in a single dynamic discrete choice specification. shock it chooses; and (iii) the store forecasts the order fulfillment probability of all future periods.
We provide a more exhaustive survey of structural econometric supply chain models in the online appendix. None of these models characterizes more than one stock of inventory.
So the following is the first structural econometric model of a multi-echelon supply chain.
Overview
A retailer operates a single distribution center (DC) and multiple stores. An external vendor ships a nonperishable good to the DC, the DC supplies the stores, and the stores satisfy local demands. The stores compete with one another for access to the DC's inventory, hoarding stock if they anticipate a shortage.
We model a representative store's inventories. The store faces newsvendor-style inventory costs-unsatisfied demands are lost, and unsold stocks are stored at a cost-and an EOQ-style shipping cost-a fixed cost accompanies each inventory delivery. The inventory cost rates are stable, but the shipping rates vary due to fluctuations in packing, trucking, and receiving capacity. Cost shock e captures these shipping expense variations. The store observes e, but we do not-it is our statistical error term.
The store faces a Markov-modulated demand process (Chen and Song, 2001 Going forward, fixed constants follow the Greek alphabet, and dynamic variables follow the Latin alphabet. The store's variables are lowercased, and the DC's uppercased.
Tomorrow's variables wear an apostrophe (e.g., m ) and today's stand bare (e.g., m).
Sequence of Events
Today's events proceed as follows:
1. The day begins with store inventory i ∈ i ≡ {0, · · · ,ī}, DC inventory I ∈ I ≡ {0, · · · ,Ī}, and demand state m ∈ m ≡ {m 0 , · · · , mm}.
2. Shipping cost shifter e ≡ {e q |q ∈ q}-a vector of i.i.d. mean-zero Gumbel random variables that correspond one-to-one with the set of feasible shipping batch sizes, q ≡ {q 0 , · · · , qq}-resolves independently of the other model variables.
3. The store orders q ∈ q units of inventory from the DC.
4. Demand d ∈ N resolves from probability mass function (PMF) δ d (d|m), and the store sells min(i, d) units of inventory.
5. Shipment indicator variable u ∈ u ≡ {0, 1} resolves from PMF δ u (u|i, I), and the DC ships s ≡ uq units to the store: the DC fulfills orders fully or not at all. We impose regularity condition δ u (1|i, I) = 0 for i + max(q) >ī to cap the store's inventory at i.
The store's inventory transitions to
7. The DC's inventory I ∈ I resolves from PMF δ I (I |I, s).
8. Demand state variable m ∈ m resolves from PMF δ m (m |d, m).
Primitives
We now define our model primitives: the state transition function and cost function.
Since the observable and unobservable state variables resolve independently (Rust, 1987, p. 1011), tomorrow's observable state, given today's state and inventory shipment, has
And today's expected operating cost, conditional on today's state and inventory shipment, is π(s|i, m) − σe s , where
First, −σe s is the idiosyncratic cost of receiving s units of inventory: scalar σ parametrizes the randomness in the store's order policy (Train, 2009, p. 44) , and the minus sign accounts for the fact that the firm minimizes costs rather than maximizes profits. 6 Second, λ1{s > 0} is the mean fixed cost of receiving a shipment. Third, µ max(d − i, 0) is the expected inventory shortage cost, the profit lost to unfulfilled demand. And fourth, η max(i − d, 0)
is the expected inventory overage cost, the burden of storing stock.
Value Function
The following system of equations characterizes the store's Bellman equation (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010; Arcidiacono and Ellickson, 2011)
where γ(s|x) ≡π(s|i, m) + β First, scalar β < 1 is the store's discount factor. Second, integrated value function ν characterizes the store's expected discounted costs, conditional on the current observable state. Third, choice-specific value function γ gives the store's expected discounted costs net the error term, conditional on the current observable state and shipment quantity. Fourth, choice probability function ρ gives the likelihood of a given order quantity, conditional on the current observable state. And fifth, Hotz and Miller's (1993) inversion function yields the expected value of the error term, conditional on the current observable state and order quantity.
Since the error terms have Gumbel distributions, functions ρ and have simple multinomial logistic and logarithmic forms. But unlike in most dynamic discrete choice models, our value function does not simplify to a standard logistic inclusive value, because the store does not receive the Gumbel shock it chooses when the DC does not fulfill its order.
Probabilistic Policy Function Iteration
From our perspective, choice probability function ρ fully characterizes the store's behavior.
Thus, we henceforth refer to ρ as the agent's "policy function," defining its order strategy in stochastic terms. We identify the optimal choice probability function with a probabilistic version of policy function iteration (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002, p. 1525 ).
First, we vectorize our functions by state space
π(s), and δ u (u) are length-|x| vectors with j th elements ν(x j ), γ(s|x j , s), ρ(q|x j ), (q|x j ), π(s|i j , m j ), and δ u (u|i j , I j ); ρ ≡ [ρ(q 0 ), · · · , ρ(qq)] is a length-|x × q| vector; and δ(s) is an |x| × |x|-dimensional matrix with jk th element δ(x k |x j , s).
Second, we express the Bellman equation in vector form
where * represents element-by-element multiplication. Third, we isolate ν in the expression above to derive operator φ, which returns the value of following a given policy forever
Fourth, we create analogous policy function operator ζ, which returns the optimal choice probabilities corresponding to a given value function
where
and ÷ and exp are element-by-element division and exponentiation. And fifth, we define ψ ≡ ζφ as the probabilistic policy function iteration operator: ψρ is the best policy for the store to follow today given that it will follow policyρ forever thereafter. The sequence ρ l+1 ≡ ψρ l converges to the optimal choice probability function at a quadratic rate (Puterman, 2014, p. 181) .
Empirical Identification
Our model is empirically identified if we can deduce cost parameters θ = [λ/σ, µ/σ, η/σ] from ρ,δ, and˜ (q)-which we can estimate nonparametrically-and from β-which we take as given (Rust, 1994; Kalouptsidi et al., 2016) . 7
Proposition 4. Our model is empirically identified if there exist order quantities q j , q k ∈ q, q j = q k such that π(q j ) = π(q k ) and rank(δ(q j ) −δ(q k )) = |x| − 1.
The rank(δ(q j ) −δ(q k )) = |x| − 1 regularity condition is only violated in knife-edge cases. So our proposition basically states that a dynamic discrete choice inventory model is empirically identified if there are two order quantities, q j and q k , that are equally costly to receive. Thus, when the shipping cost is fixed-as it is in the classic EOQ, (S, s), (Q, r), and multi-echelon inventory problems-the model is identified. 
We do not observe or estimate which item class a store-item belongs to. These nuisance parameters represent unobserved heterogeneity: a store-item's structural parameters have a discrete mixture distribution, from our perspective (Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003; Arcidiacono and Ellickson, 2011) . We estimate the class k probability, p k , state transitions,δ k , and CCPs, ρ k , with the EM algorithm, and we estimate the class k cost parameters, θ k , with nested pseudo-likelihood (NPL). But before this structural estimation, we estimate the stores' demand forecasts in reduced form.
Demand Forecasts
The distribution of tomorrow's demand depends on sufficient statistic m. We set this sufficient statistic to the expectation of demand, supposing that demand's distribution can be parameterized by its mean. We pre-estimate the expected demand with the fitted value of an OLS regression of tomorrow's sales for the given item at the given store on (i) a constant, (ii) today's sales of the given item at the given store, (iii) today's sales of the given item across all stores, (iv) today's sales across all items at the given store, (v) tomorrow's listed wholesale price, (vi) tomorrow's listed retail price, and (vii) tomorrow's posted price discount. The dependent variable, sales, is a censored measure of demand. Demand is censored when there is a stock out; the stock out rate is 1%, so 99% of demands are not censored. Nevertheless, we account for the mild censoring by disregarding tomorrow's sales if today's end-of-day inventories are in the lowest decile. Only these demands are subject to censoring: the likelihood of stocking out tomorrow when today's day-end inventories exceed the bottom decile is negligible. 8
State and Action Space
We set an item's state space, x, to a 20 · 15 · 10 = 3, 000 element grid, spanning 20 values of i, 15 values of I, and 10 values of m. We round each state in our sample to the nearest grid element. We set the grid's breakpoints to the variables' empirical quantiles, so the data are evenly dispersed.
We set an item's action space, q, to its five most-common order quantities and the median value of its remaining orders. For example, the Colgate Protective Toothbrush
Family Pack has seven distinct order quantities:
Order Quantity: 0, 24, 48, 72, 120, 240, 744, Observation Count: 12, 506, 1, 053, 87, 27, 19, 4, 1. For this item, we set q = {0, 24, 48, 72, 120, 240}, rounding the stray 744 unit order down to 240 (we round fewer than 1% of orders in this fashion).
State Transitions and Conditional Choice Probabilities
We now define reduced-form state transition function and CCP estimators. These estimators depend on weight w k (n), which denote the probability of store-item n belonging to item class k. We define weighting function w k more formally in the next section.
First, we estimate the |m| = 10 demand distributions with demand's weighted relative
where n and t represent the set of products and time periods. As in §6.2, we substitute sales for demand, disregarding observations whose prior day-end inventories are in the lowest decile.
Second, we estimate δ u analogously, subject to the regularity condition that δ u (1|i, I) =
Third, we estimate δ I with the fitted value of a w-weighted ordered logistic regression of I on s and I, and we estimate δ m with the fitted value of a w-weighted ordered logistic regression of m on d and m (again using sales for demand, in the fashion of §6.2).
Fourth, we set δ i to the store inventory PMF with mass restricted to the i elements of §6.3's state space grid (we assign mass to the grid points via linear interpolation).
Fifth, we define state transition function estimate
And finally we define CCP estimate
EM Algorithm
Following Miller (2011, p. 1849) , we use the EM algorithm to estimate w k (n)-the conditional probability of store-item n belonging to item class k-and δ k , δ u k , and ρ k -the item-class-k state transition function, order fulfillment probability function, and CCPs. Specifically, we iterate the following system of equations to convergence
and ρ k (q|x) = ρ(q|x, w k ).
The first two equations compose the "E" step, which uses Bayes rule to estimate the likelihood of the n th store-item belonging to the k th type. And the last four equations compose the "M" step, which updates our type density, state transition function, and conditional choice function estimates.
Cost Function
We estimate type k's cost parameters, θ k , with Aguirregabiria and Mira's (2002) NPL estimator, iterating the following equations to convergence
and
First, ψ θ k is the probabilistic policy function iteration operator evaluated under state transition probabilities δ k and δ u k and cost parameters θ. Second, ρ 0 k is initialized to a vectorized version of ρ k . Third, log represents element-by-element logarithmation. And fourth, w k is a length-|x × q| vector with j th element n∈n t∈t w k (n)1{i nt = i j ∩ I nt = I j ∩ m nt = m j ∩ q nt = q j }; in other words, w k is the aggregate weight assigned to a given order quantity in a given state.
Implementation
Estimating our model required $868 of computing power. We ran the job for 326 hours on an r3.8xlarge Amazon Web Services server, a machine with 244 GiB of RAM and 32 cores. We estimated the items in parallel across these processors, jointly exhausting our CPU and RAM budgets. 9 We setk = 2, estimating two dynamic programs per item, and fixed β = .9997, which translates to a 1 − 0.9997 365 = 10.3% annual discount factor.
We calculated standard errors with the bootstrap, sampling by item. Since costs are only identified up to scale, we set σ = √ 6/π, normalizing the variance of the error term, −σe s , to one (a standard Gumbel has variance π 2 /6).
Estimates
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of our cost parameter estimates. We express all costs relative to the error term's standard deviation, which we have normalized to one. Respectively, λ, µ, and η have means 3.27, 0.14, and 0.0023 and medians 2.75, 0.079, 0.0014.
The estimates exhibit substantial heterogeneity: λ, µ, and η have coefficients of variation 0.83, 1.7, and 1.1, respectively. With reduced-form regressions, we find ratios µ/ λ and η/ λ increase with profit margins-markups usually scale with the cost of lost sales and inventory storage-and decrease with sales volumes-µ and η are per-unit costs, and thus should not scale with sales, whereas λ is a per-shipment cost, and thus should scale with sales.
We compare the estimates from our dynamic model to estimates from two static benchmarks: the newsvendor and economic order quantity (EOQ) specifications (Porteus, 2002 ).
The newsvendor model sets the service level to critical fractile µ/(µ + η); accordingly, the fraction of days without a stock out is a static-model estimate of µ/(µ + η) (see Olivares et al., 2008) . Similarly, the EOQ sets q = 2λm/η; accordingly, E(q) 2 /(2E(m)) is a static-model estimate of λ/η. Table 3 compares these static-model estimates to their dynamic-model counterparts, µ/( µ + η) and λ/ η.
The median µ/(µ+η) estimate is 0.992 in the static case and 0.978 in the dynamic case.
Our dynamic model has a smaller median estimate because it factors in the cost of shipping.
The fixed shipping cost compels the stores to order in bulk, which leads them to hold more inventory, and hence to have fewer stock outs. Our dynamic model accounts for this effect, but the static model does not, attributing the lower stock out rate to a higher critical fractile. Next, the median λ/η estimate is 573 in the static case and 1,810 in the dynamic case. 10 Our dynamic model has a larger median estimate because it factors in the volatility in demand and supply. The instability in the operating environment compels the stores to place more granular (and hence more frequent) orders. Our dynamic model accounts for this effect, but the static model does not, attributing the higher order frequency to a lower shipping-to-holding cost ratio.
Counterfactual Analysis
To determine the causal effect of ration gaming, we simulate the supply chain in its absence-we speculate how the representative store would order if it didn't strategically avoid upstream stock outs. Proposition 3 establishes that it is globally optimal for the store to disregard the upstream inventory level and behave as if the supplier never stocks out (see also Clark and Scarf, 1960; Lee and Whang, 1999) . So our counterfactual benchmark is a store that believes the DC will fulfill all orders that honor theī inventory cap. To derive this benchmark, we calculate the optimal policy under alternate order fulfillment PMFδ u (1|i, I) = 1{i + max(q) ≤ī}. 11 Figure 6 compares the actual order policy, ρ, with the counterfactual order policy,ρ. While the actual policy satisfies
< 0, and
∂I∂m > 0, the counterfactual policy satisfies
∂I∂m = 0. The DC's inventory level has no bearing on the store's orders in the absence of ration gaming.
From these inventory policies, we derive estimates of the order and shipment standard deviations. We estimate the current and counterfactual order standard deviations with
and the current and counterfactual shipment standard deviations with
, where κ andκ are the state variables' current and counterfactual stationary distributions. Dividing these estimates by our estimates of the demand and sales standard deviations yields structural informational flow and material flow bullwhip estimates, both current and counterfactual. in the counterfactual scenario (both differences are significant at the p = 0.01 level). We estimate that without ration gaming, the median order quantity standard deviation would be 12.4% smaller and the median shipping quantity standard deviation would be 8.9%
smaller.
Conclusion
In this article, we do five things:
1. We show theoretically that a supply chain can suffer a run on inventory, like a bank can suffer a run on cash. This is a new perspective on Lee et al.'s (1997, p. 552) "rationing game [which] is triggered only at an upswing of demand." Under our mechanism a supply shock-a low upstream inventory level-rather than a demand shock initiates the scheming.
2. We identify an empirical signature of these inventory runs: stores, we find, are 35% more likely to place an order when the upstream inventory level is in the bottom decile. This is the first empirical evidence of ration gaming.
3. We present a counterfactual analysis that shows this ration gaming contributes significantly to the bullwhip effect. Ration gaming is the only bullwhip driver empiricists have not empirically investigated. And yet it is the most interesting, because the other bullwhip factors-demand autocorrelation, input cost shocks, and fixed shipping costs-are largely incurable. Ration gaming, on the other hand, has an antidote:
supply chain coordination.
4. We develop a new estimator of (S t , s t ) inventory models that is the first to factor both pre-order inventory level s t and post-order inventory level S t . We prove that (S t , s t ) inventory models are identified when the empirical likelihood incorporates these two values. Thus, we provide the first (S t , s t ) cost estimates that are provably identified.
5. We develop the first empirical model of inventory logistics along a supply chainthe first econometric specification that characterizes both upstream and downstream inventory stocks. Our model incorporates order batch size constraints (Veinott, 1965) , fixed ordering costs (Yang et al., 2014) , and Markov-modulated demand (Chen and Song, 2001) . Its state transitions depend on the realization of five interrelated random variables: (i) the order from the store to the distribution center, (ii) the shipment from the distribution center to the store, (iii) the current period's actual demand, (iv) the next period's expected demand, and (v) the distribution center's inventory level.
We show that the dynamic discrete choice paradigm captures these supply chain dynamics in detail. Hence, this article bridges the work by operations researchers on multi-echelon supply chains with the work by econometricians on dynamic discrete choice estimation.
Notes
1 Cachon and Lariviere (1999b) and Lu and Lariviere (2012) present the only other dynamic ration gaming models. But neither of these specifications permits the supplier to store inventory, and thus neither accommodates inventory runs.
2 Lai (2005) tested for the phenomenon in a Spanish supermarket, but concluded that "gaming is unlikely to be significant in this retail case." And whereas Fransoo and Wouters (2000, p. 87) concluded that "shortage gaming did occur and this was a major problem" in a supply chain they studied, they did not quantify or illustrate the effect in any way, because they "did encounter difficulties in measuring this, in particular in filtering the effect of order batching and shortage gaming."
3 As in §6.2, we construct our demand series by taking sales and removing the observations whose previous end-of-day inventories are in the lowest decile (i.e., removing the observations that are at risk of being censored). If anything, this correction attenuates our information flow bullwhip estimate because stores will stock more inventory when demand is more volatile.
4 Cui et al. (2015 Cui et al. ( , p. 2822 agree that "future research should break the affine structure and explore nonlinear policies such as the (s, S) policy."
5 Hall and Rust's (2000) model is purely theoretical, so we exclude it from the list. Hall and Rust could not estimate their model, for a lack of spot price data.
6 The Gumbel's special properties only correspond to its right tail.
7 Our cost parameters are only identified up to scale, so we can only determine λ, µ, and η relative to σ.
8 Disregarding observations based on endogenous inventory levels does not introduce a sample selection bias because today's end-of-day inventory level is independent of tomorrow's demand, conditional on today's forecast variables (otherwise m wouldn't be a sufficient statistic).
9 We specified a 3,000-element state space because that is the largest problem that satisfied our memory limit, subject to employing all 32 processors.
10 This ratio suggests that it costs roughly the same amount to receive a SKU as it does to hold it for 1, 810/20 = 90.5 days, since the median positive shipment quantity is 20 units.
11 Our counterfactual store acts as if the fulfillment function changes toδ u , but this function remains fixed at δ u . Our counterfactual analysis also fixes the policies of the DC and other stores. This table presents the median dynamic and static estimates of µ/(µ + η) and λ/η by product category. The dynamic estimates stem from our structural cost estimates θ = [ λ, µ, η] . The static µ/(µ + η) estimate equals the product's service level, as specified by the newsvendor model. And the static λ/η estimate equals E(q) 2 /(2E(m)), as specified by the EOQ model. 
Figure 1: Raw Data
These plots depict the raw data of a representative product: a 5-pack of 250g Guben brand whitening laundry soap sold in a Shanghai store. The graphs denote the price variables in Chinese renminbi, and the rest in physical units. They depict the time series with daily frequency, with the exception of the 2012 orders and shipments, for which the records have been lost.
Figure 2: Ration Gaming
These plots depict the point estimates (with dots) and 95% confidence intervals (with vertical bars) of two regressions' coefficients. The regressions have the same independent variables: dummies indicating the percentile of the DC's inventory level and 166 controls. The dependent variable of the "Rationing" regression is an order fulfillment dummy (this regression disregards observations without an order). And the dependent variable of the "Gaming" regression is an order placement dummy. We plot the DC inventory percentile coefficient estimates. The "Rationing" estimates report the order fulfillment probability at each DC inventory percentile minus the order fulfillment probability at the highest DC inventory percentile. And the "Gaming" estimates report the order placement probability at each DC inventory percentile minus the order placement probability at the highest DC inventory percentile. These contour plots correspond to the item-class median probability of placing an order under the current policy, 1 − ρ(0|x), and the counterfactual policy, 1 −ρ(0|x). The top plots average over mean demand m, depicting m∈m (1 − ρ(0|i, I, m))/|m| and m∈m (1 −ρ(0|i, I, m))/|m| for various i and I; the middle plots average over inventory I, depicting I∈I (1 − ρ(0|i, I, m))/|I| and I∈I (1 −ρ(0|i, I, m))/|I| for various i and m; and the bottom plots average over inventory i, depicting i∈i (1 − ρ(0|i, I, m))/|i| and i∈i (1 −ρ(0|i, I, m))/|i| for various I and m. To aggregate across products, we express i, I, and m in terms of their quantiles.
Figure 7: Current and Counterfactual Bullwhip Effect
These boxplots depict the distribution of our current and counterfactual bullwhip effect estimates, by item class. The information flow bullwhip is the standard deviation of store-to-DC orders divided by the standard deviation of demand, and the information flow bullwhip is the standard deviation of DC-to-store shipments divided by the standard deviation of sales.
